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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Warren Court is widely believed to have brought about a revolutionary 
expansion of Fourth Amendment protections against government searches and 
seizures.1 As examples of that expansion, State and local officers must adhere to 
Fourth Amendment requirements or risk having the resulting evidence excluded 
from the prosecution’s case in chief.2 A “search” no longer requires a physical 
intrusion by law enforcement officers.3 Brief investigative stops and regulatory 
inspections are subject to Fourth Amendment-based rules.4 
It is also widely believed, however, that the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment revolution fizzled.5 It seems extreme to label the project a complete 
failure, as major cases such as the ones just cited have never been overruled. 
Indeed, rather than overruling Warren Court precedent, the Burger, Rehnquist, and 
Roberts Courts have applied restrictive interpretations of Warren Court doctrine, 
twisting the words and concepts to support conclusions quite different than—
indeed sometimes opposite to—their original thrust.6 
Examining the dynamics of this counter-revolution, some commentators have 
focused on the Court’s use of the easily manipulated Katz standard for determining 
 
1.  E.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in 
the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 n.14 (2004) (citing authority). Jack 
Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects 
to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS.  L.J. 1017, 1018 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, 
Distinguished Lecture Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2009); cf. Aya Gruber, 
Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz is Made Of, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 783 (2008) (and 
sources cited at n.6) (focusing on the revolutionary aspects of Katz v. United States). 
This article will use the term “government” to apply to State and local actors as well as to federal actors. 
2.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
3.  E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
4.  E.g., Terry v Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1968) (regarding stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court of 
the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (regarding housing inspection). But see Lain, supra 
note 1, at 1369 (contending Terry “was a complete capitulation to law enforcement interests”). 
5.  E.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1018. 
6.  Accord, Gruber, supra note 1. Gruber focuses on “portions of the [Katz] decision that planted the seeds 
of future jurisprudence subverting privacy.”  Id. at 784–85; see also, e.g., Yale Kamisar, the Warren Court and 
Criminal Justice: A Quarter-century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 30 (1995) (applying the characterization of 
Burger Court’s approach to Fourth Amendment law as a “‘bloody campaign of guerilla warfare,’” quoting Albert 
W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 200 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442 (1987)). 
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when official activity is a “search.”7 Part II of this Article will contribute to this 
discussion. The subversion of the Warren Court revolution, however, goes beyond 
the definition of “search.” It includes use of Warren Court rhetoric to justify 
expansion of Reasonableness Clause8 doctrines that validate warrantless searches; 
Part III will examine this dynamic, focusing on administrative and other “special 
needs” searches. Subsequent Courts have also manipulated Warren Court rhetoric 
to allow prosecutorial use of evidence obtained in outright violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and Part IV will trace this development. 
II. IS THE OFFICIAL INTRUSION A “SEARCH”? 
The definition of “search” is important. If a government activity is not a 
“search” or a “seizure,” by its very words the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
If the Fourth Amendment does not apply, there will be no judicial oversight of the 
government activity in question absent an applicable alternative provision of the 
United States Constitution, a state constitution, or a statute. In Katz v. United 
States,9 the Warren Court changed the definition of “search” to expand the scope 
of Fourth Amendment coverage; Part A will trace this history. Part B will focus on 
two of the ways subsequent Courts have twisted the Katz rhetoric. 
A. What Was “Revolutionary” About Katz v. United States? 
1. “Search” Jurisprudence Prior to Katz 
According to the text, the Fourth Amendment covers searches and seizures of 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”10  The pre-Warren Court’s adherence to the 
text, however, was spotty, in part due to the influence of common law property 
notions.11 For example, seizure of an effect was not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment if the effect was stolen, contraband, or forfeit to the government.12 On 
the other hand, effects in which the accused had the greater property interest were 
immune from seizure under the “mere evidence rule” even if they were evidence, 
 
7.  E.g., id. at 790–91 (labeling this dynamic as a “manipulation problem”). Regarding the standard, see 
infra, Part II.A.2. 
8.  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . ..”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
9.  Katz, 389 U.S. 954. 
10.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
11.  See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886); accord, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1031–32 
(2012) (describing early Courts as using a “protected interest” approach that focused on the text and on common 
law property principles). 
12.  E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (upholding a search and seizure of contraband 
liquor); Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (holding order to produce invoices evidencing a crime was a search or seizure subject 
to the 4th and 5th Amendments).  Entrance into the area containing the effect was still governed by Fourth 
Amendment rules, however. See, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (decided same day as Gouled and 
reversing conviction on grounds that entrance into home to seize contraband whiskey was unconstitutional).   
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instrumentalities, or fruits of crime.13 As the Court concluded in 1886, 
 
[t]he search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods 
liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof [differs 
from] a search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers  
[because i]n the one case, the government is entitled to the 
possession of the property; in the other it is not.14 
 
Property interests also explained the Court’s approach to the protection 
afforded to private conversations. Although one’s words are arguably part of one’s 
“person,” overhearing a private conversation was a “search” if officers trespassed 
into the building in which the words were spoken, but not if there was no 
unconsented physical intrusion.15 And property interests explained why 
“curtilage,”16 apartments,17 hotel rooms,18 and non-public indoor commercial 
spaces, such as offices19 merited Fourth Amendment protection notwithstanding 
 
13.  Based in the notion of superior property interests, the rule prohibited officials from searching for or 
seizing items in which the accused had a greater property interest. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309–
11 (1921) (articulating the “mere evidence rule”); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967) 
(rejecting the rule).  
14.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622. The Boyd Court tied this distinction to the English statutory and common law 
in effect when the Fourth Amendment was adopted as well as to a statute passed by the Congress that proposed 
adoption of the amendment. Id. at 622. 
15.  Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1942) (denying coverage where officers overheard 
oral communications without physical entrance into the office where they were made); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438 (1928) (denying coverage where small wires were inserted into phone wires outside a residence and 
in common spaces of a large office building).  This focus on physical intrusion was based on traditional property 
law. See generally, e.g., Dressler, Joshua & Alan C. Michaels, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOL. 1: 
Investigation 68-70 (6th ed. 2013); Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 
(1977). 
16.  Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (search of garage adjacent to residence and seizure of effects; 
Ct. does not use word “curtilage,” but the two buildings were on the same city lot); Amos v. United States, 255 
U.S. 313, 315 (1921) (search of home and store in the curtilage, and noting use of “curtilage” by petitioner); see, 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (noting that review of precedent shows no Fourth 
Amendment violation unless officials physically invaded, inter alia, the curtilage). “Curtilage” is “the land 
immediately surrounding and associated with the home.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citing 
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *225).  See also, e.g., Bender, Eric Dean, Note: The Fourth Amendment in the 
Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 726 n.9 (quoting 2 Oxford 
English Dictionary 1278 (1893) defining “curtilage” as “[a] small court, yard, garth, or piece of ground attached 
to a dwelling-house, and forming one enclosure with it, or so regarded by the law; the area attached to and 
containing a dwelling-house and its out-buildings.”‘).   
17.  Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of apartment). 
18.  United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (regarding hotel room that was defendant’s “living quarters”). Accord, Hoffa 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1961). 
19.  United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 
344 (1931); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
See also, Hoffa v. United states, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (assuming that the Fourth Amendment protects offices); 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) (basing holding that Fourth Amendment did not apply 
on lack of trespass as opposed to place being an office); Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (focusing on the lack of trespass 
as opposed to one target being an office); Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1033–34 (discussing this use of the term 
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the textual limits.20 On the other hand, reverting to a textual focus, the Court did 
not allow property interests to result in Fourth Amendment protection for “open 
fields,” which are privately owned outdoor areas other than curtilage.21 
At first, the Warren Court continued the approach to Fourth Amendment 
coverage taken by earlier Courts. The Court labeled a government activity a 
“search” if it involved physical intrusion into a person’s body or clothing22; into a 
house, apartment, or hotel room23; into non-public office or other commercial 
space24; or into an automobile.25 As for conversations, the early Warren Court 
confirmed that if surreptitious monitoring occurred while the parties were in a 
public place, the Fourth Amendment did not apply.26 And, the Court clarified that 
even if the conversation took place in a private space, consent to enter that space 
 
“houses” as an example of what he calls the “liberal” version of the traditional approach).  
20.  Some of these early cases involved intrusions into areas that would not give rise to successful Fourth 
Amendment challenges in later years. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (rooming house where 
defendant had rented a room—agents were in common spaces, not ∆’s room); Trupiano v. United States, 334 
U.S. 699, 701 (1948) (barn-like building that was close to a house that did not belong to the defendant). 
21.  Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (concluding “[T]he special protection accorded by the 
Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers and effects,’ is not extended to the open fields. 
The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law”). See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, 
at 1032–33 (discussing Hester as an application of the traditional “protected interests” approach and of the “strict” 
traditional approach that limited interests to dimensions established by common law property rights).  
22.  Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Abel v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
23.  Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (decided in 
term prior to Katz) (intrusion into house; overruling Frank v. Md., 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which upheld a state 
court conviction of a homeowner who refused to permit inspection by a municipal health inspector); Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (intrusion into house); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) 
(intrusion into house); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (intrusion into house); Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505 (1961) (“spike mike” listening device that physically penetrated the wall into row house); Abel v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (intrusion into hotel room); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (intrusion 
into house); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (intrusion into house); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 
48 (1951) (intrusion into hotel room).  Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (holding search of home 
would have been covered by Fourth Amendment if done by a federal officer); Chapman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 610 (1961) (holding search of home by state officer that would have violated fourth amendment not 
admissible in federal court). 
24.  See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (locked commercial warehouse, labeling the intrusion 
an “inspection” covered by the Fourth Amendment).  Continuing the practice of previous Courts, the Warren 
Court declined to give the “search” label to intrusions into commercial spaces open to the public generally. United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (seizure of effects and search of office open to the public).  
25.  Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (intrusion 
into taxi cab by city police); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). The pre-Warren Court had interpreted 
“effects” to include automobiles. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (seizure of person, search of 
automobile, seizure of effects); United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (seizure of person and papers in auto); 
Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (search of auto and seizure of effects); Segurola v. United States, 
275 U.S. 106 (1927) (seizure of effects from car); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (seizure of effects 
from a car). 
26.  On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952) (noting that one of the conversations with a wired 
informant took place on public sidewalks).  The conversation that took place in On Lee’s laundry may also have 
been in an area open to the public.  Id. at 749 (noting that the informant engaged in the conversation “while 
customers came and went” but not specifying whether the informant was in the public or private areas of the 
laundry). 
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was all the Fourth Amendment required; monitoring the conversation was not a 
“search” even if the monitoring itself was not consensual.27 
In validating use of conversation evidence, however, the Warren Court also 
relied on a new line of reasoning: that the aggrieved party had assumed the risk 
that the other person in the conversation would reveal its content.28 As we will see, 
this “assumption of risk” reasoning would be the basis for undermining traditional 
Fourth Amendment protections in the future.29 
2. The 1967 Watershed: Hayden and Katz 
In the 1966 Term, the Warren Court did away with the “mere evidence rule,” 
which was central to the property-based analysis the Court had used for close to 
one hundred years.30 In Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, the Court said, 
“[T]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search 
and seize has been discredited.”31 Instead, the Court focused on the Fourth 
Amendment’s role in protecting individual privacy.32 
Hayden was a mixed blessing for proponents of a robust Fourth Amendment. 
On one hand, it eliminated Fourth Amendment rights by allowing officers to search 
for and seize papers and effects in which the possessor had a superior property 
interest; that trend, however, had already begun.33 On the other hand, Hayden’s 
rejection of a property-based approach in favor of a focus on privacy opened the 
door to a potential expansion of Fourth Amendment protections. 
 
27.  Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963) 
(regarding conversation in private office with obvious federal agent who was not obviously wired); see also On 
Lee, 343 U.S. at 751-52 (using consent rationale where unclear whether conversation took place in a private 
space). But see id. at 766 (Burton, J., dissenting) (arguing that the agent listening in to the monitored conversation 
had essentially entered private space without consent).  
The Warren Court had earlier relied on this reasoning in a statutory case in which officers had, with the consent 
of one party, listened to a phone conversation on an extension phone. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 
111 (1957) (noting that “[e]ach party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an 
extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation”).  
28.  Lopez, 373 U.S. at 439 (regarding a wired informant). After this, the Warren Court relied on the same 
“assumption of risk” reasoning in the context of an informant who merely remembered the conversation at issue 
without use of electronic aids. Hoffa v. United States, 395 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (regarding conversations 
conducted in Hoffa’s hotel room); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). The Court noted that the 
informant had consent to be in the hotel room and to hear the conversations at issue. Hoffa, 395 U.S. at 302. The 
Court observed that Hoffa “was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his 
wrongdoing.”  Id. (citing Lopez).   
29.  See Part II.B.1. 
30.  Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967). Although the rule was established 
in 1921, it was based on the property analysis established in 1886.  Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-
09 (1921). See discussion at supra, note 13.  
31.  Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 at 304.  
32.  Id. at 301–02, and 304–05. 
33.  Id. at 306–07 (asserting that “[t]he requirement that the Government assert . . . some property interest 
in material it seizes has long been a fiction, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving 
crime”). 
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The Court consolidated this new approach in its next term. United States v. 
Katz involved electronic monitoring that picked up only the defendant’s side of a 
phone call made from a public telephone booth.34 Focusing on a privacy rationale, 
the Court held that overhearing the conversation was a Fourth Amendment 
“search.”35 Neither the conversation nor the phone booth were Katz’s person, 
house, paper, or effect; while the Court did mention that Katz paid to use the phone 
and the booth, it did not base its holding on the notion that the booth was the 
equivalent to a hotel room or on any other notion of a “protected interest.”36 
Furthermore, there was no physical penetration into the booth, 37 and the Court 
rejected reliance on physical entry38 and on a trespass-based analysis altogether.39 
Instead, in finding the monitoring to violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
announced a standard that has come to be known by its summary in Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence: a government activity is a “search” when it violates a 
person’s  “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”40 
In the course of creating this new test and applying it to the eavesdropping in 
the case, the Katz Court used additional rhetoric. The Court distinguished the 
situation here, where Katz had sought the privacy of the enclosed phone booth, 
from a situation in which the defendant had not taken such precautions: 
 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. 
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.41 
 
As we will see, the Court’s use of this “assumption of risk” rationale42 would later 
 
34.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
35.  Id. at 351–53. 
36.  Id. at 352. But see Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1034 (suggesting the Katz Court could have analyzed the 
issues using the “protected interests” approach for “houses”). 
37.  Id. at 348 (noting that the agents placed the listening device on the outside of the phone booth). 
38.  Id. at 353 (“The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate 
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”).  
39.  Id. (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling”). But 
see Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012) (asserting Katz did not repudiate the concern for 
government trespass); id. at 409 (asserting “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, 
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test) (emphasis in original). 
40.  See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis provided); accord, Dressler & Michaels, supra note 
15, at 71–73 (noting that the majority opinion in Katz did not clearly define “search” but that the concurring 
opinion “filled the void”). 
41.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted).  
42.  The Katz majority did not use the word “risk,” but it cited cases that encompassed that concept. Id. 
(citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)) (regarding an undercover officer’s observations) and United 
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (regarding observations of items in plain view on the deck of a ship)).  Justice 
White, concurring, did use the term in referencing the earlier cases dealing with overheard conversations.  Id. at 
363 n.**. 
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be used by post-Warren Courts in applying the Katz test. 
Many believe that the Warren Court adopted the Katz test to expand the reach 
of Fourth Amendment protections.43 Still, by the time the Warren Court ended in 
June, 1969, the Katz test had made a bottom-line difference in only one case, to 
support respondent’s standing to challenge a warrantless search and seizure.44 
B. Twists in the Notion of “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” 
Post-Warren Courts pulled back on Katz’s promise of a more expansive notion 
of what constitutes a “search.”45  This Part will address two ways the Court has 
accomplished this retrenchment within the confines of the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” standard. First, in analyzing what expectations of privacy are 
reasonable, the Court often eschews consideration of what ordinary people 
realistically expect in normal daily life. Instead, the Court describes abnormal or 
even socially unacceptable or deviant behavior that people might engage in and 
concludes that law enforcement officers should be able to do the same without 
judicial oversight.46 As a second approach, the Court sometimes uses what 
amounts to a “superior property interest” analysis refashioned in “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” terms. 
1. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Regarding Observations that 
Private Persons “Could” Make 
The post-Warren Court combined “assumption of risk” language with the Katz 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test to deny the “search” label to government 
 
43.  E.g., Gruber, supra note 1, at 783; Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1038 (stating “[t]he obvious reason behind 
the reframing in Katz was to expand the reach of the Fourth Amendment beyond its enumerated interests”). But 
see Lain, supra note 1, at 1369 (arguing Katz was a “concession to law enforcement interests on the issue of 
wiretapping”). 
44.  Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). Katz did not affect the bottom line on other late Warren 
Court cases. In some, the “search” label could have been applied under the pre-Katz approach, and the focal issue 
was whether the searches were properly conducted. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search of 
house); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (search of person).  See also, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 
171-72 (1969) (assuming that the surveillance involved a “search” under both pre-Katz and Katz holdings and 
remanding the cases for factual findings regarding standing).  In one case, the Court decided that the new test 
announced in Katz would not be applied retroactively. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
45.  In addition to the applications to be discussed, the Burger Court also used the “expectation of privacy” 
test to curtail the scope of defendants’ “standing” to raise a 4th Amendment challenge to evidence. Compare, 
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264-64 (1960) with United States v Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) 
(overruling Jones); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
46.  Accord, e.g., George M. Dery III & James R. Fox, Chipping Away at the Boundaries of Privacy: Intel’s 
Pentium III Processor Serial Number and the Erosion of Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations, 17 Geo. State 
Univ. L. Rev. 331, 345–-46 (2000); Gruber, supra note 1, at 791 and 795 (dividing this dynamic into 
“manipulation” and “normativity” aspects); Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay 
Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481 (2010) 
and articles cited therein.   
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examinations that easily could have been “searches” under pre-Katz  doctrine.47 
The Burger Court began the trend when it used the “assumption of risk” rationale 
to undercut normal social expectations for anyone who wants to take advantage of 
the conveniences of modern life. Use of checking accounts and credit cards is one 
such area, and banks maintain the records that, in an earlier era, individuals might 
keep in their homes or offices. Ordinary people might expect that the cancelled 
checks and other information kept in bank records would be safe from warrantless 
government inspection. On the contrary, however, United States v. Miller held that 
the there is no “legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’” in the contents of checks, 
financial statements, and deposit slips because they “contain only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary 
course of business.”48 That being so, “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing 
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”49 As the government activity is not a “search,” the Fourth 
Amendment does not require judicial oversight through a warrant or otherwise. 
This rationale came to be known as the “third-party doctrine.”50 
In Smith v. Maryland, the Burger Court went on to use the third-party doctrine 
to conclude that officers did not conduct a “search” when they obtained records of 
the numbers dialed from defendant’s phone. The Court concluded that the 
defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information because a 
person voluntarily turns the information over to the phone company.51 Thus, Smith 
“assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he 
dialed.”52 
The rationale in these “third-party doctrine” cases—voluntary conveyance of 
information and assumption of risk that a third party would use it—put the onus 
on citizens to opt out of modern life if they want to retain privacy. One can prevent 
government knowledge of one’s financial information by choosing to use cash and 
a cookie jar instead of bank accounts, checks, and credit cards. One can prevent 
the government from easily tracking the identity and frequency of communication 
contacts by meeting face-to-face instead of using the telephone. Failure to take 
 
47.  Accord, Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1038 (asserting that the “Katzian ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
approach . . . in fact has threatened to undermine the Fourth Amendment’s traditional protections”), id. at 1039–
41 (noting that the Katz test has narrowed the reach of the Amendment by reducing the importance of common 
law principles). 
48.  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). Defendant objected to ATF agents obtaining his 
records from banks, arguing “that he has a Fourth Amendment interest in the records kept by the banks because 
they are merely copies of personal records that were made available to the banks for a limited purpose and in 
which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 
49.  Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 751–52; the Court also cited the pre-Katz cases 
Hoffa and Lopez). The Court of Appeals found that the subpoenas did not “constitute adequate ‘legal process’ 
and suppressed the evidence. Id. at 439. 
50.  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018); Kerr, Orin S., The Case for the 
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009). 
51.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–44 (1979).  The Fourth Amendment was at issue because police 
had requested the phone company to install a “pen register” to capture the dialed numbers.  Id. at 739 n.4. 
52.  Id. at 744. 
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these extreme measures, however, is tantamount to assuming the risk of 
government surveillance and therefore “voluntarily” agreeing to it.53 
Furthermore, without citing the “third-party doctrine” cases or using their 
precise language, the Burger Court extended this privacy-destroying rationale to 
another activity essential to modern life: driving a car. In Texas v. Brown, the 
defendant’s car was validly halted at a “routine driver’s license checkpoint”; with 
the driver still inside, officers shined a light and peered into the interior of the car. 
The Burger Court concluded that this behavior did not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment “search.”54 This was so because the driver had no “legitimate 
expectation of privacy” in the car’s interior, as  “inquisitive passersby” could also 
view that area from outside the vehicle.55 It is debatable whether member of the 
general public could bend down, use a flashlight, and look into a car that was, for 
example, stopped at a traffic light, and it is even more debatable whether a member 
of the general public would even do so. In the Court’s view, however, this 
abnormal example of possible behavior becomes the norm for judging whether the 
officer violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The following discussion will review how the Rehnquist Court continued to 
combine an abnormal view of behavior with the “assumption of risk” rationale and 
apply the combination to a broader swath of everyday life. One line of cases 
involved observations of activity in the curtilage; in these cases, while ostensibly 
applying the Katz standard, the Court came to the same conclusions it might have 
adopted under the old property-based analysis. On the other hand, in a case 
involving trash left at the curb for collection, the Court used an arguably abnormal 
interpretation of the Katz test and thereby got around limits that the property-based 
approach might have imposed. 
a. Aerial Observations of Curtilage 
The Court’s adoption of an abnormal behavior approach to the “search” 
standard emerges clearly in its cases regarding aerial searches of curtilage. Houses 
have traditionally occupied a special place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,56 
 
53.  Accord, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (2001) (labeling the Court’s approach as a “vigilance model of privacy”); cf, e.g., Gruber, 
supra note 1, at 791 (noting that Katz itself “hinges privacy on an individual’s cautionary behavior”) and at 804–
05 (developing this theme). See also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 35 (challenging the Court’s notion that the 
assumption of risk involved in the third-party doctrine cases is “voluntary”). 
54.  Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983).  
55.  Id. at 740. 
56.  See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984) (asserting that society recognizes as 
justifiable the expectation that private residences are free of governmental intrusion and that warrantless searches 
and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable absent exigencies); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 589-90 (1980) (noting that the “zone of privacy” is most clearly defined by “the physical dimensions of an 
individual’s home” and that the right to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion into the home is at the 
core of the Fourth Amendment); Hester v. United States, 265 US 57, 59 (1924). Stephanie M. Godfrey & Kay 
Levine, Much Ado About Randolph: The Supreme Court Revisits, 42 Tulsa L. Rev. 731, 732 (2007); Thomas Y. 
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and the curtilage has been treated as an integral part of the house.57 Nevertheless, 
the Rehnquist Court58 concluded that people who effectively use high walls to 
screen their yards from observation by normal passersby knowingly expose those 
yards to government observation from fixed-wing planes flying at 1000 feet or 
from helicopters hovering at 400 feet over the yard.59 As these flights are not 
illegal,60 “any member of the public” could rent a plane or helicopter and do the 
same thing.61 The Court concluded “that respondent’s expectation that his garden 
was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that 
society is prepared to honor.”62  Thus, it is not a “search” for government officials 
to undertake these activities. 
The Court’s application of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard 
reflects an abnormal view of expectable human behavior. Common sense suggests 
that it is not “reasonable” to expect people to put a covering over their yards to 
prevent aerial snooping.  In addition while it is technically possible that someone 
with an interest in another’s activities would use planes or helicopters to peer into 
a walled yard, common sense would tell us that this would be unusual, not to say 
aberrant behavior. It is likely that such behavior by a private individual, once 
discovered, would be strongly disapproved as a violation of acceptable social 
norms.63 By not acknowledging that mainly government agents would want to take 
 
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 642 (1999). 
57.  See supra note 16. 
58.  The Burger Court opened the door to this line of reasoning by applying Katz’s “knowingly expose” 
language to conclude that when police observed a woman’s behavior as she stood in the doorway of her house 
she was in a public place. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 40, 42 (1976). Although the doorway of her 
house was part of the curtilage (if not the house itself), she had no reasonable expectation of privacy because 
“[s]he was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she 
had been standing completely outside her house. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). Id. at 212–13 (concluding 
that the area observed was curtilage).  It is common for passersby to observe people on their front porches or 
yards, and as Santana took no steps to shield herself from the view of passersby, the reasoning is hard to refute. 
59.  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (plurality) (regarding a helicopter flying at 440 feet over 
the curtilage and viewing the inside of a greenhouse through holes in the roof); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207, 209 (1986) (regarding warrantless observation, from a fixed-wing plane at 1000 feet, of a backyard that was 
completely enclosed by a six-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence). 
60.  The Ciraolo opinion was at pains to point out that the plane was “within navigable air space.” Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. at 209. Similarly, the Riley plurality mentioned that helicopter flights in public airways are routine in 
the United States and are not “unheard of” in the county at issue; that it was not “contrary to law or regulation” 
for a helicopter to fly below the allowed altitude for fixed-wing aircraft; and (putting the burden on the accused) 
that there was no evidence that the helicopter interfered with Riley’s use of his greenhouse or curtilage.  Riley, 
488 U.S. at 450–52. 
61.  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, at 451 (1989) (plurality); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, at 213–
14 (1986). Interestingly, in a case decided the same day as Ciraolo but not involving domestic curtilage, the Court 
and Government conceded that “surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance 
equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.” Dow 
Chemical v United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (using satellite technology as an example). The Dow 
Chemical Court, however, did not think a sophisticated aerial mapping camera qualified because it could not 
penetrate walls or windows or hear conversations. Id. at 239. 
62.  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214. 
63.  See, e.g., Steven Dale, “Not Over My Back Yard,” The Gondola Project, Nov. 15, 2009, available at 
http://gondolaproject.com/2009/11/15/not-over-my-back-yard/ (regarding neighborhood outrage at proposed 
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such steps—and by declining to consider seriously the problems posed by use of 
sophisticated technology to see what could not be viewed without a physical 
trespass—the Court was out of touch with the Katz promise. 
Of course, the aerial observations would probably not have been “searches” 
under the pre-Katz property approach as there was no physical trespass into the 
curtilage.64 However, Hayden and Katz had seemed to replace the physical trespass 
approach in favor of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.65  Without 
rejecting that standard, the post-Warren Court reinstated the previous bottom line. 
b. Rummaging Through Trash 
In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that it is not a Fourth Amendment 
“search” for officers to rummage through garbage placed in closed containers at 
the curb for pick-up.66 The curb was outside the curtilage, but the Court did not 
conclude that it had been abandoned.67 Thus, the garbage was still Greenwood’s 
property, and people often take their effects into public. If the Court had focused 
its “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis on socially approved behavior of 
neighbors and passersby, it arguably would have found the rummaging to be a 
“search.” As Justice Gorsuch later observed, 
 
I doubt . . . that most people spotting a neighbor rummaging 
through their garbage would think they lacked reasonable grounds 
to confront the rummager. Making the decision all the stranger, 
California state law expressly protected a homeowner’s property 
rights in discarded trash. . . . Yet rather than defer to that as 
evidence of the people’s habits and reasonable expectations of 
privacy, the Court [in Greenwood] substituted its own curious 
 
aerial tram route over houses and backyards). Faced with a fait accompli, residents remain resentful.  See, e.g., 
Randy rag and Aaron Scott, “From Controversy to Icon: Portland’s Aerial Tram Turns 10,” Oregon Public 
Broadcasting, Feb. 13, 2017, available at https://www.opb.org/radio/programs/state-of-wonder/article/portland-
aerial-tram-ohsu-10-year-anniversary/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Objections exist 
even though the tram moves quickly and does not hover; as a frequent rider, I can attest that it would be difficult 
to make detailed observations of backyard activities. 
64.  See supra at notes 22–25. 
65.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); accord, 
e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748–49 (1971) 
(plurality); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 365, 368 (1969). But see Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 
(2012); (asserting Katz did not repudiate the concern for government trespass); id. at 409 (asserting “the Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test) 
(emphasis in original). 
66.  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).  
67.  Cf. Gruber, supra note 1 (noting that the Court’s apparent concession that Greenwood might have 
retained a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash). Note that finding abandonment might have been a 
stretch. In the closest Supreme Court precedent at that time, the Court found that a guest had abandoned trash left 
in his hotel-room wastepaper basket after he had checked out. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).  
On the other hand, the Court previously found that a person had abandoned a jar containing contraband whiskey 
by dropping the jar on the ground. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).   




One aspect of the Greenwood Court’s “curious judgment” was the notion that 
Greenwood had “voluntarily”69 given his effects to the trash collector, who 
acceded to official requests to hand the effects over to police.70 The Court did not 
use the term “assumption of risk,” but it used the elements of that approach: first, 
that “the trash collector . . . might himself have sorted through respondents’ trash 
or permitted others, such as the police, to do so”71; and second, that “respondents 
exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim” of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.72  This conclusion was based on the Court’s 
sense of what people could do, which was in turn based on abnormal or socially 
disapproved behavior: 
 
[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at 
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, 
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. . .. 
Accordingly, having deposited their garbage ‘in an area 
particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of 
speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having 
strangers take it’ . . . respondents could have had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they 
discarded.73 
 
While the Court buttressed its assertion with one example each of trash being 
disturbed by “animals . . . scavengers, [and] snoops,”74 its analysis “employ[ed] 
the worst case scenario as its standard.”75 
Greenwood was decided in 1988, and the rise of homelessness had already 
increased the incidence of people going through garbage left at the curb; people 
were generally unhappy with the situation, although some found ways to 
accommodate the problem.76 
 
68.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2266 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting, objecting to the 
“often unpredictable—and sometimes unbelievable—jurisprudence” engendered by the Katz standard) (citation 
omitted). 
69.  See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 (analogizing the placement of garbage at the curb to “voluntarily” 
exposing dialed phone numbers and backyard activities). Greenwood was required by local ordinance to place his 
trash on the curb for pickup.  Id. at 54–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70.  Id. at 37. 
71.  Id. at 40–41. 
72.  Id. at 40. 
73.  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 
397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981). 
74.  Id. at 40 (also listing “children” without an example). 
75.  Accord, e.g., Dery, supra note 46, at 345–46; Gruber, supra note 1, at 799. 
76.  See, e.g., Allan R. Gold, Seeking the Middle Ground With the Homeless on Trash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
26 1990, at B.1.  Thirty years later, people are still complaining about the problem of others going through their 
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* * * * 
 
The premise behind the Court’s reasoning in these “assumption of risk” 
decisions is disturbing. Essentially, if ordinary, everyday people could undertake 
the examination at issue, even if their doing do is unlikely or disapproved, 
government agents should be able to do the same thing without judicial Fourth 
Amendment oversight.77  It may be worth noting that the Court takes a different 
approach once it has determined by official activity is, in fact, a “search.” In 
determining whether an acknowledged “search” is reasonable without a warrant, 
the Court sometimes declines to accept deviant or socially unacceptable behavior 
as the Fourth Amendment standard.78 The contrast in approaches is striking: if the 
question is the reasonableness of a “search,” judicial oversight for Fourth 
Amendment adherence is guaranteed (either at the warrant stage or through a post-
search suppression motion). There is no judicial oversight once the Court decides 
that the activity is not a “search’ at all, and so the Court’s “assumption of risk” 
analysis leaves the Fourth Amendment out of the picture. 
2. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Some Contraband Investigations 
The Court has always interpreted the Fourth Amendment to allow officers to 
seize contraband such as illegal drugs. Under the pre-Katz approach, the 
government’s power to seize the drugs was based on its superior property 
interest.79 Even then, however, officers needed a warrant or an alternative Fourth 
Amendment doctrine to enter the place where the drugs were kept.80 Yet 
notwithstanding disavowal of the property-based approach in Hayden and Katz,81 
the post-Warren Court has relied on the government’s interest in contraband to 
conclude that there may be no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in a closed 
 
trash. See, e.g., “Keeping hobos out of your trash?” (Question and Answer discussion on Yelp), available at 
https://www.yelp.com/topic/las-vegas-keeping-hobos-out-of-your-trash (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review); “Someone is digging through my trash and recycling. . .is this legal?” (Thread on reddit), 
available at 
https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice/comments/68tkdh/ma_someone_is_digging_through_my_trash_and/ (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
77.  Accord, Heffernan, supra note 53, at 4–6 (describing the Court’s approach as exempting police from 
everyday expectations of forbearance and requiring them to avoid only egregious violations of privacy norms). 
78.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006) (basing the requirement of a warrant to enter a home 
on the conclusion that ordinary people would decline to enter if one co-tenant refused permission despite the other 
co-tenant granting it).  While the Court has said that one test of “legitimate” privacy expectations is 
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,” its approach does not include at least some 
behavior that is criminal.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
79.  See supra, Part II.A.2. 
80.  E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (applying an “automobile exception” to the search 
of a vehicle for contraband liquor); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (reversing conviction due to 
unconstitutional entry into home to seize contraband whisky). 
81.  See supra notes 10, 27, 28 & note 30 and accompanying text. 
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container when the target of the search is unlawful drugs. That being the case, 
intrusion into the container is not a “search,” and so no warrant or Reasonableness 
Clause validation is necessary. 
This line of reasoning began with the “drug dog” cases. These are cases in 
which a trained dog sniffed the outside of a container and alerted if it sensed 
narcotics inside. The Burger Court concluded that the canine sniff does not violate 
the container owner’s reasonable expectation of privacy because it reveals only 
contraband.82  The Rehnquist Court agreed.83 
Toward the end of its run, the Burger Court extended this reasoning beyond 
the drug dog context. United States v. Jacobsen involved agents properly taking 
control of a package that Fed Ex employees had opened to reveal a suspicious 
white powder.84  The agents’ field testing of the powder was an “additional 
intrusion.”85  The Court noted, however, that this intrusion was not a “search,” as 
“[a]chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is 
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.”86 
3. Is the Official Intrusion a “Search”? 
When is police activity a Fourth Amendment “search”? The Katz “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” standard is still the main test, and the cases and doctrines 
 
82.   United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (Noting the sniff does “not expose noncontraband 
items that otherwise would remain hidden . . . Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence of absence of 
narcotics”) (emphasis supplied). 
The rationale in Place does not extend to emanations that do not involve contraband. See Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001) (invalidating the warrantless use of a thermal-imaging device to confirm the use of heat lamps 
in a suspected marijuana growing operation in a private home); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) 
(invalidating the warrantless use of an electronic tracking device to detect the existence of a non-contraband can 
of ether inside a house); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 n.23 (1984) (distinguishing from drugs the 
private possession of obscenity). In addition, the lack of Fourth Amendment protection applies only to the odor 
itself: gaining access to the object to be investigated could involve a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure. 
E.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation in officer and dog making an 
unconsented entry into the curtilage for the dog to sniff at the front door of the house); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120–
21 (noting that the agent’s “assertion and control over the package and its contents” was a “seizure,” but finding 
the seizure reasonable); Place, 462 U.S. at 707-10 (declining on the facts to validate the seizure of luggage without 
probable cause); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (reversing conviction on grounds that entrance into 
home to seize contraband whiskey was unconstitutional). 
83.  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“Official conduct that does not ‘“compromise any 
legitimate interest in privacy” is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. We have held that any interest in 
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘“legitimate,” and thus governmental conduct that only reveals the 
possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (“The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car. . . does 
not transform the seizure into a search [because, as in Place] an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require 
entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics”); 
see also Caballes, 543 U.S.  at 409 (rejecting challenge to premise that dog sniffs reveal only narcotics); cf. 
Jardines, 466 U.S. at 10 (not disputing that the dog sniff itself is not a “search,” but focusing, in a property-based 
analysis, on the officer’s entry into the curtilage with the dog). 
84.  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, at 121 (1984). 
85.  Id. at 122. 
86.  Id. at 123 (asserting that this conclusion was “dictated” by United States v. Place).  
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reviewed in this Part are still good law. There are signs, however, that the extreme 
intrusiveness possible with modern technology may be giving the Roberts Court 
pause. The Court has resurrected the property-based approach to apply the 
“search” label to official use of a GPS tracking device87 and has applied a property-
related rationale to label one use of drug-sniffing dogs as a “search.”88  Similarly, 
but without reliance on the property rationale, the Court has partially retreated from 
application of the third-party doctrine in cases involving a information stored on a 
mobile-phone89 and cell-site location data.90 These pull-backs are few, however, 
leaving a vast array of ordinary behavior and locations open to official 
investigation without judicial oversight based on the Fourth Amendment. 
III. WAS THE WARRANTLESS “SEARCH” NEVERTHELESS 
“REASONABLE”? 
Part II explored how post-Warren Courts used the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” standard to conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not apply. Post-
Warren Courts have also used the notion of “reasonable expectations of privacy” 
to broaden government power to conduct what are admittedly “searches” without 
a warrant and, at times, without individualized suspicion. The Court has done this 
by using a balancing test to determine whether a warrantless intrusion is reasonable 
and by putting a finger on the government side of the balance through the concept 
of a “diminished” or “lesser” expectation of privacy.91 And, as before, Warren 
Court decisions that seemed to expand Fourth Amendment protections set the stage 
for use of Warren Court rhetoric to restrict Fourth Amendment rights. 
A. The Expansion of Fourth Amendment Coverage in Camara and See 
In 1967, the Warren Court treated as a “search” a type of intrusion to which 
the Court had not previously applied the Fourth Amendment: administrative 
inspections for violations of civil statutes and regulations. Camara v. Municipal 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco applied the Fourth Amendment to 
housing inspections for code violations sanctioned by civil fines92; See v. Seattle 
applied the Fourth Amendment to civil inspections of non-public portions of 
 
87.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012). 
88.  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013). 
89.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
90.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
91.  There are, of course, other ways the Court has undermined “reasonableness” analysis to further law-
enforcement interests.  See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 1, at 1050–51 (discussing use of reasonableness analysis in 
police creation of exigent circumstances). 
92.  Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) 
(approving administrative searches with warrants based on “reasonable legislative or administrative standards 
[that are] satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.”). Camara overruled Frank v. State of Maryland, 359 
U.S. 360 (1959), which had upheld conviction for refusing to allow a health inspector to make a warrantless 
inspection of a home. Id. at 528. 
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commercial premises.93 
As it extended the concept of “search” to these inspections, the Warren Court 
introduced two new concepts. First was the use of a balancing test to evaluate the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search: “the need to search [balanced] against the 
invasion which the search entails.”94 The second was the notion that it is sometimes 
“reasonable” to eliminate traditional criminal probable cause and individualized 
suspicion as pre-requisites to a valid “search.”95 These new concepts opened the 
door to the additional restriction of Fourth Amendment protections. 
B. Twists in the Use of Administrative Search Rhetoric 
Although the Warren Court ended in 1969, Justice Douglas, a member of that 
Court, extended the thrust of the Camara and See opinions when authoring 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States in 1970.96 Camara and See had relaxed 
traditional requirements by approving administrative searches without criminal 
probable cause or individualized suspicion, but the Court required inspectors to get 
an administrative warrant.97 Colonnade Catering suggested that even the relaxed 
administrative warrant was not required if there was a long history of regulation of 
the industry at issue and an adequate statutory framework existed to define the 
limits of the search.98 In United States v. Biswell the Court clarified that the 
inspection must be central to the government’s enforcement efforts.99 
A few years later, the Burger Court added a new wrinkle to the analysis by 
folding in the “reasonable expectation of privacy” rhetoric: pervasive regulation 
means that the business at issue has a diminished expectation of privacy.100 
Bolstered by this new combination of ideas, the Court began to extend the concepts 
of diminished privacy and close regulation beyond the administrative search 
context. 
 
93.  See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
94.  Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.  
95.  Id. at 538–39; See, 397 U.S. at 545–46. 
96.  Colonnade Catering Corp. v United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76–77 (1970) (regarding inspection of a liquor 
licensee for possible violation of excise tax law). In Colonnade Catering the search was unconstitutional, 
however, because Congress had not authorized forcible warrantless entry. Id. at 77. It would be disingenuous to 
credit the Burger Court with this case, as Chief Justice Burger authored the dissent, joined by Justices Black and 
Stewart.  Id. at 77. The Court referred to “the special treatment of inspection laws of this kind” as set out in Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  Id. 
97.  Camara, 387 U.S. at 538–39; See, 387 U.S. at 545–46. 
98.  Colonnade Catering, 397 U.S. at 76–77. 
99.  United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1972) (involving inspection under the Gun Control 
Act of 1968); see also, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702, 708–10 (1987) (involving inspection under New 
York vehicle dismantler statute); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602, 606 (1982) (involving inspection under 
the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977).  
100.  Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315–16; see also, Burger, 482 U.S. at 703; Dewey, 452 U.S. at 605. 
“Close” or “pervasive” regulation means refers to regulation specific to the type of industry, not the amount of 
generally applicable regulation that applies.  Burger, 482 U.S. at 703–06; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 313–14 (1978). 
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1. A New Rationale for Auto Searches 
In 1973, in Cady v. Dombrowski, the Court considered the warrantless search 
of a car that had been impounded following an accident.101 No existing doctrine 
was directly on point. The so-called “auto exception,” adopted in 1925, involved a 
car that was mobile on the highway, which was not this car.102  The Warren Court’s 
“inventory search” doctrine applied to searches conducted for the protection of the 
police and the car’s operator, which was not this search.103 
To validate this search, the Court adopted a new rationale. The Court relied on 
the pervasive regulation of cars by the states and the sense that state and local 
police often come in contact with cars for “community caretaking functions” as 
opposed to crime.104 
 
The constitutional difference between searches of and seizures 
from houses and similar structures and from vehicles stems both 
from the ambulatory character of the latter and from the fact that 
extensive, and often noncriminal contact with automobiles will 
bring local officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence, fruits, or 
instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband. 
 
Tellingly, the Court cited an administrative search case, United States v. Biswell, 
as analogous.105 
In 1974, a plurality in Cardwell v. Lewis further expanded the rationale for 




101.  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (regarding a car that had been impounded following an 
accident).   
102.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (allowing the warrantless search of vehicles on the 
highway if police had probable cause to search them, as the mobility of the vehicle made it easy for the driver to 
leave the jurisdiction before a warrant could be obtained); accord, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804–
09 (1982) (reviewing basis for Carroll and noting importance of probable cause); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 367 (1976).  
103.  The search in Dombrowski was to find evidence, that is, the defendant police officer’s service 
revolver, and no inventory of the car was attempted. 413 U.S. at 436-37. Inventory searches are not searches for 
evidence. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (explaining that a police department regulation 
required the impounding officer to remove all valuables from the car and attach a property tag to it); Cooper v. 
State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 61–62 (1967) (concluding that where the car was potentially subject to forfeiture 
and had to be kept for considerable time, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for police to search the car 
for their own protection  The Dombrowski Court noted the inventory search cases but did not rely on them. 413 
U.S. at 442. 
104.  Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441. 
105.  Id. at 442 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); see supra note 100 and accompanying 
text. 
106.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (asserting “[w]at a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”).  See supra text 
accompanying note 41. 
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[a vehicle’s] function is transportation and it seldom serves as 
one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.  A car has 
little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public 
thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain 
view. . . . ‘What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.’ This is not to say that no part of the interior of an 
automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a 
desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one’s right to be 
free of unreasonable government intrusion. But insofar as Fourth 
Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right 
to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.107 
 
The Court thus came to combine a variety of rationales to cover searches of 
both mobile and immobile vehicles. The Court used this multi-faceted approach to 
reaffirm the reasonableness of inventory searches of the interior of lawfully 
impounded vehicles,108 the warrantless search of the interior of some mobile 
homes,109 and the suspicionless and warrantless search of the dashboard of an 
automobile to observe the vehicle identification number.110 The “reduced 
expectation of privacy” rationale for vehicle searches has also, indirectly, affected 
the search of closed containers found inside a vehicle.111 
2. Closely Regulated Persons 
The Fourth Amendment specifically extends its protection to “persons.”112 
Nevertheless, the Court has used the “close regulation” rationale to validate 
warrantless searches of persons, without individualized suspicion, for evidence of 
 
107.  Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590–91 (1974) (plurality) (citations omitted) (finding a reduced 
expectation because the vehicle’s “function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the 
repository of personal effects” and because a car “travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents 
are in plain view”). The Court of Appeals had considered taking the paint scrapings to be a search (417 U.S. at 
589), and the Court’s analysis proceeded on that basis. Id. at 591–92. 
108.  See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976) (regarding inventory search of a car 
impounded for parking violations). See also, Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (hinting that 
warrantless searches of cars are valid, even without the exigency of mobility, based on the reduced expectation 
of privacy that comes with the pervasive regulation of automobiles); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 
392 (1985) (“[t]he public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this 
compelling governmental need for regulation”). 
109.  Carney, 471 U.S. at 388, 392 (treating the structure as an auto, as opposed to the “house,” when the 
mobile home “is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes—temporary or otherwise”).  
110.  New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112–19 (1986) (focusing on the physical characteristics of an 
automobile and its pervasive regulation and noting that placement of papers obscuring the VIN was insufficient 
to create a privacy interest).   
111.  See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574–76 (1991) (allowing officers who are validly searching 
vehicles to open closed containers in the vehicle that could hold the item being sought). 
112.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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use of alcohol or other drugs. This line of cases began when the Court approved 
administering drug tests to persons in specific occupations in given circumstances. 
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, for example, the circumstance was 
involvement in “certain train accidents.”113 The Rehnquist Court concluded that 
the government’s interest in breath, blood, and urine tests outbalanced what the 
Court saw as a minimal intrusion on railroad employees: 
 
[T]he expectations of privacy of covered employees are 
diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is 
regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in 
substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees.114 
 
Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court upheld 
a program mandating that Customs Service employees undergo suspicionless drug 
tests when they applied for promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal 
drugs that required them to carry firearms or handle classified materials.115 
 
The fact of close regulation was evidently crucial to the holdings in these cases, 
as the Court has declined to approve suspicionless drug tests for those in an 
occupation not considered to be closely or pervasively regulated.116 Nevertheless, 
there are evidently limits to the reach of that rationale.  Although automobiles are 
closely regulated117 and driving them can be dangerous, in 2013 the Court rebuffed 
prosecutors’ attempt to apply the diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles to 
the person driving the car, at least when a test more intrusive than collection of 
urine was involved.118 
The Court has, however, applied the “pervasively regulated” rationale outside 
of the business context. Specifically analogizing “students who voluntarily 
participate in school athletics” with “adults who choose to participate in a ‘closely 
regulated industry,’” the Court approved the suspicionless, warrantless urine 
 
113.  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (noting that the tests were 
authorized by regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970). 
114.  Id. at 627 (balancing the government’s interest against a reduced expectation of privacy to find a 
required blood test). See also id. at 620–24, 628–33 (evaluating the government’s interest); id. at 616–18, 624–
27 (concluding intrusions were minimal); id. at 619 (articulating the balancing approach); National Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989) (decided the same day as Skinner and applying the 
same approach). 
115.  National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). The Court noted that 
the program was “not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement,” that the government had 
“substantial interests” similar to those in Skinner, and that these outweighed the employees’ privacy interests. Id. 
at 666, 668. 
116.  Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 305 (1997) (regarding candidates for political office). 
117.  See supra notes 103–04.  
118.  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 159 (2013) (rejecting the suggestion that drivers be subject to 
warrantless blood tests for blood alcohol level in favor of requiring a case-by-case determination of exigency 
based on the probability of dissipation of the alcohol before a warrant could be obtained). The Court concluded 
that the reduced privacy in vehicles does not carry over to piercing a motorist’s skin. 
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testing of school children who participate in interschool athletics; citing Skinner 
and Biswell, the Court concluded that both “have reason to expect intrusions upon 
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”119  The Court later applied this 
holding to students engaged in a broad range of extra-curricular activities.120 
3. The “Reasonableness” of Government “Special Needs” 
Searches involving closely regulated businesses and persons are one example 
of activities that involve a concept known as “special needs” searches, “not 
designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement.”121 The analysis folds 
the “special need” into the government side of the balancing test.122 The 
government’s “special need” is often seen as considerable, so when the other side 
of the balance involves a “diminished” expectation of privacy—for example due 
to pervasive regulation—the Court easily finds warrantless and even suspicionless 
searches to be acceptable. 
It is important to note that even though “special needs” do not include ordinary 
law enforcement, an official conducting the “special needs” investigation can seize 
evidence of crime in “plain view.”123 Thus, “special needs” searches can and do 
lead to criminal prosecution and conviction.124 
Protection of individual Fourth Amendment rights will inevitably lose in this 
balance. 
IV. ALLOWING UNREASONABLE WARRANTLESS “SEARCHES” 
As the following discussion will trace, federal courts have excluded evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment since the late nineteenth century, 
and the Warren Court extended this requirement to the states.125 Nevertheless, the 
Warren Court also made an exception to allow prosecutors to use such evidence to 
impeach the testimony of defendants who take the stand at their criminal trials.126 
 
119.  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657, 664–65 (1995); see also, id. at 652–54 (citing 
Skinner for use of a balancing test and both Skinner and VonRaab for examples of suspicionless searches that 
comport with the Fourth Amendment). 
120.  Board of Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Co. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
829–34 (2002); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–665 (1995).   
121.  National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 351–52 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment) (coining the term and applying it more 
broadly to include searches based on less than probable cause and a warrant such as stops and frisks).  
122.  Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); see also, e.g., City of Los Angeles, 
California v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462–63 (2013); Missouri v. 
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 159 (2013). 
123.  See, e.g., Dressler & Michaels., supra note 15, at 227–232. 
124.  This dynamic is especially fraught when both civil and criminal sanctions attend a regulatory 
violation.  E.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 692 (1987). 
125.  See infra, Part IV.A.1. 
126.  Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (regarding defendant’s testimony on direct examination). 
See also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (extending the rule to defendant’s testimony on cross-
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In addition, prosecutors may use evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment in presenting a case to the grand jury.127 While it is certainly possible 
to object to these holdings, the grand jury does not determine guilt or innocence, 
and defendants can avoid impeachment by not taking the stand. 
The following discussion addresses an arguably more extreme use of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment:  the introduction, in the 
prosecutor’s case in chief, of evidence obtained in unreasonable warrantless 
searches. This development is the result of the so-called “good faith” exception. 
“Good faith” does not mean the “search” comported with Fourth Amendment 
requirements; it means the trial court cannot exclude the unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence. Thus, the “good faith” exception to exclusion results in 
convictions based at least in part on evidence that has no Fourth Amendment 
validity. 
A. How the Warren Court Set the Stage for a “Good Faith” Exception 
Federal courts have excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment since 1886.128 In 1961, the Warren Court required state courts to do 
so as well.129 Nevertheless, a number of Warren Court opinions contain rhetoric 
that later Courts would combine to make it easier for prosecutors to introduce in 
the case in chief evidence seized in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment.130 
Two examples of such rhetoric seem particularly significant: the shift in 
articulating the rationale supporting exclusion, and the increased use of the term 
“good faith” in discussing official behavior. 
1. Rationales Supporting Exclusion 
The Supreme Court first excluded evidence as a reaction to Fourth 
Amendment violations by courts, not police. The first instance occurred in Boyd v. 
United States, decided in 1886. The Boyd Court’s use of the Fourth Amendment 
looked very different from today’s practice. This was a forfeiture case,131 and the 
“search and seizure” was the court’s order to produce an invoice, not a direct 
physical intrusion.132 The Court found that the Fourth Amendment was 
 
examination). 
127.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
128.  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
129.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
130.  It is important to distinguish the situation where evidence is admitted because the court concludes that 
violation of the Fourth Amendment did not cause seizure of the item at issue. Doctrines include “attenuation” 
(e.g. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963); 
“independent source” (e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)); and “inevitable discovery” (e.g., Nix 
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445–46 (1984)).  
131.  Id. at 634 (asserting that “forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offenses committed by him, 
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal”). 
132.  Id. at 634.  By statute, failure to produce the invoice would be treated as a confession of the 
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inextricably linked with the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, holding 
that the court’s order to produce a document constituted an unreasonable “seizure” 
and that the Fifth Amendment prohibited admission of the evidence.133 
Almost thirty years later,134 in Weeks v. United States, the Court again 
determined that exclusion of evidence was required for a trial court’s violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. The defendant had moved for return of letters taken from 
his house allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment.135 The lower court 
denied the motion as to material intended to be used as evidence in the criminal 
trial against Weeks. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower 
court’s refusal to turn over the papers involved “a denial of the constitutional rights 
of the accused, . . .”136  The Court was clear that the Fourth Amendment violation 
was on the part of the lower court, not just the federal officers who had seized the 
letters: 
 
The effect of the 4th  Amendment is to put the courts of the United 
States  . . . in the exercise of their power and authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and 
authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the guise of law.  . .  and the duty of giving [this protection] 
force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted [sic] under our 
Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.137 
 
The Weeks Court considered the issue be a court’s right to use evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment in a criminal case.138 It believed that courts 
would be complicit if allowed to do so: 
 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the 
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . .  
should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are 
 
government’s criminal allegations. Id. at 620. “In order to apply the fourth amendment to the factual situation in 
Boyd, Justice Bradley had to interpret ‘search and seizure’ as including the compulsory production of documents.” 
The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States. 1886-1976, 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 186–87 (1977). 
133.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633–34. 
134.  An intermediate case, Adams v. New York, decided in 1904, applied an exclusionary rule based on 
evidentiary principles. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Accord, Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The 
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1365, 1374 (1983) (naming Adams as one of the three seminal cases leading to adoption of the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule but noting that Adams turned out to be “just a wild turn in the exclusionary rule roller coaster 
track”).  
135.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 388–89 (1914).  The Court expressly limited the exclusionary 
rule to evidence obtained by federal officers, as it did not consider the Fourth Amendment to apply to state 
officers.  Id. at 398. 
136.  Id., 232 U.S. at 398. 
137.  Id. at 391–92 (emphasis supplied). 
138.  Id. at 393. 
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charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to 
which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the 
maintenance of such fundamental rights.139 
 
The lower court should have returned the documents to Weeks.140 While the words 
“deter” and “deterrence” do not appear in the opinion,141 the Weeks Court saw the 
Fourth Amendment as restraining both federal officers and the federal courts142 
and saw the exclusion of evidence as affecting law enforcement and the federal 
courts equally.143 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as we know it grew out of these 
cases.144 In the 1920s, the Court applied the rule to situations that presented issues 
quite different from those in the prior cases, and so broadened the scope of the 
rule’s application.145 
The sense that courts were participants in Fourth Amendment violations 
appeared next in a majority opinion in the 1943 case, McNabb v. United States.146 
The Court excluded evidence based on its supervisory powers over federal trials, 
not the Fourth Amendment147; the search had been conducted by state officers, and 
 
139.  Id. at 392 (emphasis supplied); see also, id. at 394 (“To sanction [the unlawful search and seizure] 
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions 
of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action”). 
140.  Id. at 398.  
141.  See also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that Weeks’ use of the exclusionary rule did not 
rest on a deterrence rationale but on the “principled basis” of avoiding “‘sanctioning’ or ‘ratifying’ the police 
lawlessness that produced the proffered evidence. . ..”). 
142.  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92 (“The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of the United States 
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the 
exercise of such power and authority . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
143.  Id. at 394 (“To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, 
if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution . . . .”).   
144.  Accord, e.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and 
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983) (“[n]one of 
the three Supreme Court cases credited with producing the rule focused on whether the exclusionary rule, as we 
know it, should exist-yet somehow, in 1914, after all three cases had been decided, the rule was established”).  
The third case was Adams v. New York, 192 U.D. 585 (1904), in which the exclusion argument was based on 
evidentiary, not constitutional, principles. Stewart at 1374. 
145.  Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920); Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 
298, 306–11 (1921), abrogated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 33–34 
(1925); Stewart, supra note 135, at 1375–76 (discussing how Silverthorne Lumber and Gouled “significantly 
broadened the narrow rule of exclusion of the Boyd and Weeks cases).  
146.  McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943).  Strong articulations of this perspective also appeared in 
dissents to the Court’s finding of no Fourth Amendment violation in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 463–65 
(1928). Justices Brandeis and Holms would have found a violation based on the federal officers’ committing a 
criminal act under State law. Id. 469–70 (Justice Holmes); id. at 489–90 (Justice Brandeis).  Justice Brandeis 
based his conclusion in part on a sense that when prosecutor knowingly seeks to use evidence obtained by criminal 
means, “the government itself would become a lawbreaker.” Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes 
agreed: “[N]o distinction can be taken between the government as prosecutor and the government as judge. If the 
existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge 
to allow such iniquities to succeed.” Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
147.  McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341–42.   
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the Fourth Amendment did not yet apply to them.148 In excluding the evidence at 
issue, however, the Court relied on the judicial integrity rationale, specifically 
comparing courts that permitted such evidence to accessories after the fact.149 
At first, the Warren Court also seemed to focus on judicial integrity. In Elkins 
v. United States, the Court exercised its supervisory powers over federal courts to 
require exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally obtained by state officers.150 The 
Court discussed at length the need to promote “healthy federalism” and the 
“imperative of judicial integrity.”“151 Regarding the latter point, the Court asserted 
that federal courts should not “be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a 
Constitution they are sworn to uphold.”152 
The shift came a year after Elkins, in Mapp v. Ohio, when the Warren Court 
for the first time imposed the exclusionary rule on the states—the forums for the 
majority of criminal prosecutions.153 Perhaps because this was such a big step, or 
because judicial integrity can also be implicated when exclusion prevents the 
factfinder from having all the facts,154 the Court gave a number of reasons for doing 
so.  First it noted changes in “factual considerations” since Wolf.155  Next, it 
discussed the importance of the Fourth Amendment itself: avoiding turning the 
Amendment into a mere “form of words,” citing the ability to exclude evidence as 
an essential part of the Fourth Amendment “right,” and expressing the desire to 
treat the Fourth Amendment similarly as the other right-granting amendments.156 
The Mapp Court also mentioned precedent but reviewed it quite selectively. 
Notwithstanding the long history of cases emphasizing judicial integrity, the Mapp 
Court’s review of exclusionary rule precedent emphasized deterrence. It implied 
that the exclusion in Weeks was based on deterrence even though that case did not 
mention the word or even focus on the concept; its focus was preventing the federal 
 
148.  The Court applied the Fourth Amendment to state officers in Mapp v. Ohio, 67 U.S. 643 (1961). 
149.  McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) (“Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through 
such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without 
making the courts themselves accomplices in wilful [sic] disobedience of law.”) (emphasis added). 
150.  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Elkins eliminated the “silver platter doctrine,” which 
had allowed federal criminal courts to use evidence seized by state and local officers in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment as long as no federal officers were involved in the violation. Id. at 208. Use of the supervisory powers 
was necessary, as the Court had earlier declined to require state courts to exclude evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In discussing exclusion, the Court mentioned 
“deterrence” in passing, but did not specify whether it was police or courts that would be deterred. Id. at 31–32. 
The dissent in Wolf also mentioned deterrence and focused on deterring police and prosecutors. Id. at 42–43 
(Murphy, J., dissenting).   
151.  Id. at 221–23. 
152.  Id. at 223. The Court asserted that the purpose of excluding evidence is to deter, but it did not specify 
the target of the deterrence. Id. at 217. 
153.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
154.  See, e.g., John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (1974). 
155.  Id. at 653. The Court mentioned changes in state rules (651–52), changes in rules developed by the 
Supreme Court to eliminate the “silver platter” doctrine (Elkins), to formulate “a method to prevent state use of 
evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal agents” (Rea v. United States., 350 U.S. 214 (1956) and to relax 
requirements (Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (653)). 
156.  Id. at 655–56. 
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system generally from benefitting from the unconstitutional behavior.157 The Mapp 
Court mentioned McNabb without noting that case’s reliance on the judicial 
integrity rationale.158 Finally, going further, the Mapp Court said that “the purpose 
of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to 
disregard it’,” quoting Elkins, but not mentioning that case’s equal reliance on 
judicial integrity.159 
The Mapp Court did mention judicial integrity, but in a way that relegated it 
to secondary status, thus giving impetus to the Court’s retreat from what some 
commentators have called the “majestic exclusionary rule.”160 The consideration 
did not appear in the opinion until the Court was finished discussing precedent and 
had begun discussing why extending the exclusionary rule to the states “makes 
very good sense.”161 In this context, the Court mentioned the “‘imperative of 
judicial integrity’”162 along with “avoidance of needless conflict between state and 
federal courts”163 and the inability to assume “that, as a practical matter, adoption 
of the exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement.”164 At the end of the opinion, 
however, the Court seemed to give judicial integrity and police deterrence equal 
billing: “Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more 
than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than 
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial 
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.”165 
After Mapp, the Warren Court discussed the rationale for the exclusionary rule 
in only three cases,166 and its justifications for the rule were inconsistent. One case 
 
157.  Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648. 
158.  Id. at 649–50. 
159.  Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217) (emphasis added).  
160.   Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 398 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 391, 398 (2010). 
161.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
162.  Id. at 659 (again citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).  
163.  Id. at 657–58 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221). 
164.  Id. (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218). 
165.  Id. at 660. 
166.  In some other cases the Court found no “search” or “seizure,” so the Fourth Amendment did not apply. 
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lewis v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 
U.S. 647, 649 (1963); Lanza v. State of New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).  In other cases the Court found the 
“search” or “seizure” to have been reasonable.  Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Warden, 
Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967); Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
In some cases where the Court found Fourth Amendment violations, the posture of the case made it unnecessary 
to discuss the exclusionary rule’s validity. See Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 (1969); Von Cleef v. New 
Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court of City & 
Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Berger v. State of N.Y., 
388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965); Aguilar v. State of Tex, 378 U.S. 
108 (1964). In cases where exclusion was an issue, the Court merely applied the rule without discussing its 
rationales. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 753 (1969); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 
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emphasized a deterrence rationale without mentioning judicial integrity.167 
Another case emphasized deterrence and judicial integrity equally.168 The third 
case emphasized deterrence of “lawless police conduct” as a justification for the 
exclusionary rule (again mischaracterizing precedent) and mentioned the need to 
avoid reducing the Fourth Amendment to a “mere ‘form of words’”169; however, 
the Court also acknowledged judicial integrity as a “vital function,” hinting at the 
“accessory after the fact” metaphor170 and ultimately saw the deterrence and 
judicial integrity rationales as intertwined.171 
2. Use of the Term “Good Faith” in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s first mention of “good faith” in a Fourth Amendment 
case occurred in 1925.  The term popped up in Carroll v. United States as part of 
a discussion of whether officers had probable cause to stop the car they searched.172  
The Court quoted from a 1923 civil suit for false imprisonment in which the 
defendant had the burden to establish lack of probable cause for the arrest at issue: 
“[G]ood faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be 
grounded on facts within knowledge of the Director General’s agent.”173 
The term does not appear again in a Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
opinion until 1947.  Harris v. United States involved the search of an entire 
apartment incident to an arrest in the living room. The Supreme Court found the 
search to be reasonable and mentioned in passing that the Circuit Court of Appeals 
had affirmed the conviction, in part, because the agents had conducted the search 
in good faith.174 As it found the search to be constitutional, the Court did not reach 
any issue involving the exclusionary rule. 
The Warren Court did not use the notion of “good faith” in discussing 
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. It did, however, use the 
term more frequently than previous Courts had done: while commenting on the 
motives or intent of government agents in cases regarding a non-Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule175; commenting in passing on the rationale of a 
 
(1964); Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
167.  Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965) (declining to give Mapp retroactive effect). 
168.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1963) (extending the exclusionary rule to 
derivative evidence).  
169.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (extending both the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary 
rule to stops and frisks). Id. at 12. 
170.  Id. (“Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions 
of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions”). 
171.  Id. at 12–13. 
172.  Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161–62 (1925). 
173.  Id. at 161 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923)). 
174.  Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 156, 154–55 (1947). 
175.  Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (declining to order retroactive application a newly interpreted 
statutory exclusionary rule, saying that doing so “would overturn every state conviction obtained in good-faith 
reliance” on previous precedent); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 
2020 / Twists in the Use of Warren Court Fourth Amendment Rhetoric 
816 
lower court176; in noting that an officer’s good faith is not enough to establish 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion177; and allowing a “good faith” defense to 
a local judge sued for civil rights violations.178 The Warren Court’s use of the term 
“good faith,” however, when combined with its elevation of the deterrence 
rationale, set the stage for subsequent Courts to seriously undermine enforcement 
of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause. 
B. Development of the “Good Faith” Exception 
The Burger Court soon began exploring and developing a connection between 
the “good faith” and deterrence” notions. It ultimately used the combination as a 
basis for creating a “good faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule. The journey to a “good faith” exception can be described in three discrete 
components: (1) the elimination of judicial integrity as a reason to exclude 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the combination of 
the now-focal rationale of deterrence with the notion of an officer’s subjective 
good faith; and (3) the downgrading of exclusion of evidence from a “rule” to a 
“remedy.”  For ease of writing, this discussion will use the term “unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence” for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The first component was the elimination of judicial integrity as a reason to 
exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The Burger Court accomplished this 
over the course of a number of decisions.179 In a 1974 opinion, the Burger Court 
did not mention judicial integrity at all when it allowed use of unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence in front of the grand jury.180 In 1975, the Court articulated 
judicial integrity and deterrence as equally deserving of consideration when 
declining to give retroactive effect to a substantive Fourth Amendment ruling.181 
 
367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961) (regarding a due process challenge to State procedures authorizing searches and seizures 
for obscene material); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 219, 226 (1960) (noting, in a case in which exclusion 
of improperly seized evidence was still based on the Fifth Amendment, the scarcity of evidence in the record that 
the behavior would be “serious misconduct” if true, but a “finding of bad faith is  . . . not open to us on this record” 
and pointing to the trial court’s conclusion that the actions were taken in “good faith”).  
176.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 754 (1969) (assuming for purposes that officers had probable 
cause to arrest, but noting that lower courts had relied on the officer’s good faith in procuring an arrest warrant 
that turned out to be invalid). 
177.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“And simple “good faith on the part of the arresting officer is 
not enough.’ * * * If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,’ only in the discretion of 
the police’”); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (“We may assume that the officers acted in good faith 
in arresting the petitioner. But ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough’”); Henry v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (“Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary. On the other hand, good 
faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough”).  
178.  Pierson v. J.L. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
179.  Accord, Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting the shift to a deterrence rationale and interest balancing). 
180.  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Court’s opinion never mentioned judicial 
integrity despite that consideration being raised by the dissent. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
181.  United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975).  
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Nevertheless, relying on a revisionist history that cited no cases earlier than Mapp, 
the opinion asserted that “the Court has relied principally upon the deterrent 
purpose served by the exclusionary rule”182 and rested its decision on the premise 
that “the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police 
conduct. . ..”183 That same year, declining to allow some prisoners to raise Fourth 
Amendment issues in postconviction suits, the Court noted the Warren Court’s 
mention of deterrence in Elkins and principal reliance on deterrence in Mapp.184 It 
went on to assert that judicial integrity had played a “limited role” in post-Mapp 
opinions185 and concluded that deterrence of police misconduct is the “primary 
justification” for excluding evidence.186 In a 1976 holding declining to exclude 
evidence in a civil tax proceeding, the Court focused on deterrence of police 
officers as the reason to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.187 The Court did mention judicial integrity in a footnote, but treated 
it as a variation of the deterrence rationale.188 Finally, in several cases, the Court 
buttressed its downgrading of the judicial integrity rationale by commenting on the 
negative effect exclusion of relevant evidence has on factfinding.189 
The second component was the combination of the now-focal deterrence 
rationale with the notion of an officer’s subjective good faith.190 The connection 
for the Court was its conclusion that it was either impossible or extremely difficult 
to deter officers who had a good faith belief in that their actions comported with 
 
182.  Id. at 536. 
183.  Id. at 542. 
184.  Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1975) (addressing the ability to raise Fourth Amendment issues 
in post-conviction suits). 
185.  Id. at 485 (mentioning cases that did not address objections to use of evidence in the prosecution’s 
case in chief made by a defendant with standing). 
186.  Id. at 486. 
187.  United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976); see also, id. at 446 (asserting, with citations to 
Calandra and Peltier, that “the Court . . . has established that the ‘prime purpose’ of the rule, if not the sole one, 
‘is to deter future unlawful police conduct’”). 
188.  Id. at 458 n.35. The Court noted that “[t]he primary meaning of ‘judicial integrity’ in the context of 
evidentiary rules is that the courts must not commit or encourage violations of the Constitution”; since the Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs at the time of the search, the question is “whether the admission of the evidence 
encourages violations of Fourth Amendment rights,” and this is the same as asking “whether exclusion would 
serve a deterrent purpose.” 
189.  United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626, 627 (1980) (regarding use of evidence seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 
735 n.8  (1980) (regarding a defendant who the Court concluded lacked standing to challenge the search); Janis, 
428 U.S. at 447,, 448–49; Peltier, 422 U.S. at 535–38 (finding it crucial that exclusion of “concededly relevant 
evidence” is done to “enforce a constitutional guarantee that does not relate to the integrity of the factfinding 
process”); Stone, 428 U.S. at 485 (concluding that he judicial integrity concern “has limited force as a justification 
for the exclusion of highly probative evidence”); see also, Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) 
(rejecting retroactive application of a post-Mapp holding); cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984) (making 
same observation in context of a 6th Amendment right-to-counsel confession case). 
190.  As a precursor to this conclusion, the Court asserted that judicial integrity is not “offended” when 
officers act in good faith. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 537–38. See also, Sundby & Ricca, supra note 161, at 424 (crediting 
the combination of the deterrence rationale with themes hostile to viewing exclusion as a Fourth Amendment 
right as contributing to curtailing exclusion of evidence). 
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the Fourth Amendment.191 
The third component was to view the exclusion of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment as a mere remedy.  As Sundby and Ricca have 
explained, the Warren Court had continued the tradition of viewing exclusion of 
evidence as a “rule” that was an integral part of the Fourth Amendment right.192 
The “counter-narrative” that sees exclusion of evidence as a mere remedy also has 
a long history.193 Despite the Warren Court’s adherence to the exclusionary “rule” 
as inherent in the Fourth Amendment, “remedy” rhetoric crept into at least one 
Warren Court opinion.194 The view of exclusion as a mere remedy did not 
dominate, however, until the Burger Court,195 where it played an important role in 
developing the “good faith” exception. 
The Court’s combination of deterrence, good faith, and “mere remedy” finally 
came to fruition in 1984 when United States v. Leon firmly established a “good 
faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for cases where the 
Fourth Amendment violation was made by the magistrate who had issued the 
warrant.196 The Court found officers’ reliance on the warrant to be reasonable,197 
and the opinion focused on deterrence as the justification for the exclusionary 
rule.198 With that in mind, the Court balanced the costs and benefits of the 
exclusionary rule and concluded that the balance usually favored adoption of a 
 
191.  Janis, 428 U.S. at 438 n.35 (noting that in addition to other considerations diminishing any deterrent 
effect, “the officers here were clearly acting in good faith . . . a factor that the Court has recognized reduces 
significantly the potential deterrent effect of exclusion”); accord, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that 
the deterrence rationale bloomed in the post-Warren Court era); see, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 
(1978) (declaring that the affiant’s good faith was an inherent premise of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause 
and holding that a hearing is required to determine existence of a false material statement in a search warrant 
affidavit made in bad faith); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) (asserting that “[n]o conceivable 
purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which, at the time it was found on the person of 
the respondent, was the product of a lawful arrest and a lawful search. To deter police from enforcing a 
presumptively valid statute was never remotely in the contemplation of even the most zealous advocate of the 
exclusionary rule”); cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (asserting, in a pre-Miranda confession 
case, that where police have acted in good faith, as opposed to engaging in willful or negligent violation of the 
law, “the deterrence rationale loses much of its force”). But see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 
(1982) (rejecting government’s argument that 4th Amendment. decisions should not be applied retroactively to 
all convictions not yet final at the time of the decision if officers acted in good faith). 
192.  Sundby & Ricca, supra note 161, at 411–14 (noting that the pre-Warren Court had referred to 
exclusion as a “remedy” in Wolf v. Colorado, but the Warren Court restored the “rule” language in Mapp); see 
also, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 31 (noting the Burger Court’s “‘deconstitutionalizing’” the exclusionary rule). 
193.  Id. at 414–23. 
194.  Id. at 423–24 (reviewing Justice Stewart’s opinion in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)). 
195.  Id. at 424–33 (reviewing the opinions in United States v. Calandra and Stone v. Powell). 
196.  U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984). See also, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) 
(applying Leon and discussing why the officer’s reliance was reasonable); Kamisar, supra note 6, at 33 (calling 
the “good faith” exception a “reasonable mistake” doctrine). 
197.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
198.  Id. at 906 (repeating the language from Calandra regarding the rule being “a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect” and asserting that 
deterrence can be accomplished without automatic exclusion in all cases); see also id. at 918 et seq. (focusing 
entirely on deterrence). 
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“good faith” exception when officers acted on the basis of a facially valid 
warrant.199  The Court considered deterrence to apply only to law enforcement 
officers, not to courts.200  In fact, the Court’s only mention of judicial integrity was 
to downgrade that consideration in the face of the dissenting opinions’ urging that 
the concern should remain an important consideration.201 The Court did not discuss 
at all the origin of exclusion of evidence to address Fourth Amendment violations 
by courts.202 
After Leon the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts applied the “good faith” 
exception when officers, relying on officially provided misinformation, acted on 
what they reasonably thought was probable cause203; when officers relied on a 
statute, later found unconstitutional, that authorized warrantless administrative 
searches204; and when officers relied on “binding judicial precedent.”205 
C. The “Good Faith” Exception and the Allowance of Unreasonable Warrantless 
Searches 
Once upon a time, searches compatible with the Warrant Clause were the 
standard (or at least the preference) and searches validated by Reasonableness 
Clause doctrines were “exceptions to the warrant requirement.” 
 
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the 
(Fourth) Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ 
and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
and well-delineated exceptions.206 
 
199.  Id. at 907–924. 
200.  Id. at 916. 
201.  Id. at 921 & n.22.  Among other points, Justice Brennan’s dissent objected to making deterrence the 
sole purpose of the exclusionary rule, asserting that this view “relegates the judiciary to the periphery” and 
reminding that the fourth amendment restrains the government as a whole. Id. at  932 (Brennan, J., dissenting, 
joined by Marshall).  Brennan also noted that deterrence was not a relevant concern in the early exclusionary rule 
decisions.  Id. at 938.  Justice Stevens’ dissent did focus on deterrence, asserting that the Court’s holding 
diminishes its effect. Id. at 974–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  However, Stevens also asserted that the holding 
“tarnishes the role of the judiciary” and the original rationale for exclusion (judicial integrity) “retains its force as 
well as its relevance.” Id. at 921 n.2. 
202.  See supra notes 130–49. 
203.  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145–46 (2009) (involving misinformation provided by clerks 
in police departments other than that of the arresting officer); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995) (involving 
misinformation provided by court clerks). 
204.  Ill v Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (asserting that an officer cannot “be said to have acted in good-
faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have known that the statute 
was unconstitutional”). 
205.  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2011) (discussing reliance on a Supreme Court doctrine 
that was later modified). 
206.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted).  
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The list of “reasonable” warrantless searches has grown since the Warren Court, 
but the Court has continued to repeat this mantra207 and to state that the Warrant 
Clause is “the bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection.”208 
Thus, it is striking that in cases where the “good faith” exception applies there 
is neither a valid warrant nor an applicable Reasonableness Clause doctrine. In 
United States v. Leon, there was no Fourth Amendment warrant because the 
document purporting to be a warrant lacked probable cause.209 In the two “good 
faith” cases decided by the post-Burger Court there was no warrant at all at the 
time of the search because the warrant had been withdrawn or quashed.210  In these 
cases lacking a valid warrant, no Reasonableness Clause doctrine surfaced to 
validate seizure of the evidence. Similarly, two “good faith” cases that involved 
admittedly warrantless searches also lacked a supporting Reasonableness Clause 
doctrine.211 
The Fourth Amendment was violated in all of these cases, but so what? The 
Court now considers exclusion of evidence to be a mere “remedy” instead of an 
integral part of the Fourth Amendment right.212 Treating exclusion as a remedy 
may be justifiable if there is another remedy to make the right operational. In 1961, 
the Warren Court did, in fact, authorize such a remedy against state and local 
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,213 and in 1971 the Burger Court created a similar 
remedy against federal officials, modeled on § 1983.214 It is arguable that these 
remedies are illusory given the barriers the Court has placed on successful use of 
these causes of action.215 
So far, the “good faith” exception applies only when a Fourth Amendment 
 
207.  E.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2543 (2019); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2221 (2018); City of Ontario, Calif., v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128, 133 & n.4 (1990); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 312 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470–
71 (1971). 
208.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978). Consistent with its move toward a “good faith” 
exception, however, the Court continued to note that the Warrant Clause “takes the affiant’s good faith as its 
premise.” Id. 
209.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 903–05 (1984). 
210.  Herring v United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1995). 
211.  In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the officer relied on a statute later found unconstitutional. In 
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), the officer relied on a Reasonableness Clause doctrine contained in 
binding precedent that was later overturned. 
212.  Supra notes 191–94. 
213.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
214.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
215.  See., e.g., Harrington, James C., Overcoming Section 1983 Hurdles: Using the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to Re-open the Civil Rights Door and Hold Government and Police Accountable, Georgetown 
University Law Center Continuing Legal Education 25th Annual Section 1983: Civil Rights Litigation (2007), 
2007 WL 5269445 at *1, n.1 and at *2-3; cf. Kamisar, supra note 6, at 33 (noting “[t]he ‘substantial’ costs said 
to be exacted by the exclusionary rule would also be exacted by any other means of enforcing the Fourth 
Amendment that worked”) (emphasis in original); id. at 39 (noting that a meaningful tort remedy also puts 
pressure on courts to water down search-and-seizure rules). 
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violation was on the part of actors other than law enforcement officers themselves, 
and there may even be limits to the exception where it does apply.216  Nevertheless, 
use of the exception means that prosecutors may freely use evidence seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment making their case against those accused of 
crimes. 
As the Supreme Court said in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is a settled and 
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and 
every injury its proper redress.”217 As the Warren Court observed in Terry v. Ohio, 
 
[I]n our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which 
the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some 
conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and 
disapproves other actions . . . . A ruling admitting evidence in a 
criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of 
legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an 
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional 
imprimatur.218 
 
The current Court’s use of the “good faith” exception is tantamount to authorizing 
a category of searches that may be conducted in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By employing rhetoric that is easily manipulatable, the Warren Court planted 
the seeds that later Courts would use to frustrate an expansive interpretation of 
Fourth Amendment protections. This article has traced ways that counter-
revolution occurred in three basic areas of Fourth Amendment law: determining 
whether government activity is covered by the Amendment at all, determining 
whether a warrantless search was “reasonable,” and determining whether evidence 
seized through an unreasonable, warrantless search is nevertheless admissible in 
the prosecution’s case in chief.219 Although the current Court may be reversing the 
trend in some areas—especially those involving intrusive technology—the 
promise of a Warren Court expansion of Fourth Amendment rights has often been 
defeated by use of the tools that Court itself provided. 
 
 
216.  But see, Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (suggesting that recklessness in 
maintaining a warrant system or systemic errors might eliminate a “good faith” exception). 
217.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803); see also, id. at 163 (noting that affording a remedy for 
injury is the “very essence of civil liberty” and citing Blackstone). 
218.  Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1968). 
219.  As Professor Kamisar noted, “[t]here are two principal ways to reduce the impact of Mapp v. Ohio: 
(a) by narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary rule . . . and (b) by shrinking the scope of the amendment itself. . . 
.”  Kamisar, supra note 6, at 30. As this article has traced, the Court has used Warren Court rhetoric to do both. 
